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Abstract
This paper analyzes the equilibrium distribution ofwealth in an economywhere
firms’ productivities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, returns on factors are de-
termined in competitivemarkets, dynasties have linear consumption functions and
government imposes taxes on capital and labour incomes and equally redistributes
the collected resources to dynasties. The equilibrium distribution of wealth is ex-
plicitly calculated and its shape crucially depends on market incompleteness. In
particular, a Paretian law in the top tail only arises if capital markets are incom-
plete. The Pareto exponent depends on the saving rate, on the net return on capi-
tal, on the growth rate of population and on portfolio diversification. On the con-
trary, the characteristics of the labour market mostly affects the bottom tail of the
distribution of wealth. The analysis also suggests a positive relationship between
growth and wealth inequality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The statistical regularities in the distribution of wealth have attracted considerable in-
terest since the pioneering works of Pareto (1897) (see Atkinson and Harrison (1978)
and Davies and Shorrocks (1999) for a review). The efforts of economists have focused
primarily on the understanding the micro-economic causes of inequality. A more re-
cent trend, reviewed in Chatterjee et al. (2005), has instead focused on mechanistic
models of wealth exchange with the aim of reproducing the observed empirical distri-
bution. A general conclusion is that the Pareto distribution arises from the combination
of a multiplicative accumulation process, and an additive term.
This paper attempts to establish a link between these two literatures, by showing
that the same mathematical structure emerges in a model which takes into account ex-
plicitely the complexity of market interactions of a large economy. In brief, the model
describes how idiosyncratic shocks in the production of firms propagating through the
financial and the labor markets shape the distribution of wealth. Market networks,
i.e. who works and who invests in each firm, play a crucial role in determining the
outcome. As suggested in Aiyagari (1994), the shape of the equilibrium distribution
crucially depends on market incompleteness, i.e. on the fact that individuals do not
invest in all firms. With complete markets, the equilibrium distribution of wealth is
determined solely by shocks transmitted through the labor market, and it takes a Gaus-
sian shape, a result at odds with empirical evidence (see, e.g., Klass et al. (2006)). Only
when frictions and transaction costs impede full diversification of dynasties’ portfolios,
the shape of the top tail of the distribution follows a Paretian law. The Pareto exponent
computed explicitly allows to individuate the effects which different parameters have
on wealth inequality. We find that an increase in the taxation of capital income or in the
diversification of dynasties’ portfolios increases the Pareto exponent, whereas changes
in the saving rate or in the growth rate of the population impact inequality in different
ways, depending on technological parameters, due to indirect effects on the return on
capital.
The bottom tail of the equilibrium distribution of wealth is instead crucially affected
by the characteristics of labour market. With a labour market completely decentral-
ized, so that individual wages immediately respond to idiosyncratic shocks to firms,
the support of the equilibrium distribution of wealth includes negative values; on the
contrary if all workers receive the same wage, i.e. bargaining in the labour market is
completely centralized, shocks are only transmitted through return on capital and the
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distribution of wealth is bounded away from zero.
Finally, we show that, if the growth rate of the economy is endogenous, there is a
negative relationship between the latter and the Pareto exponent, i.e. wealth inequality.
2 The Model
We model a competitive economy in which F firms demand capital and labour. We
assume all the wealth is owned by N households (assumed to be infinitely lived), who
offer capital and labour and decide which amount of their disposable income is saved.
Wages and returns on capital adjust to clear the labour and capital markets respectively.
We derive continuum time stochastic equations for the evolution of the distribution
of wealth, specifying the dynamics over a time interval [t, t+ dt) and then letting dt→
0. We refer the interested reader to Fiaschi and Marsili (2009) for details, and report
directly the dynamical equations. The wealth pi of household i obeys the following
stochastic differential equation:
dpi
dt
= s
[
(1− τk) ρpi + (1− τl)ωli + τkρp¯ + τlωl¯
]− χ− νpi + ηi, (1)
where ηi is a white noise term with E [ηi (t)] = 0 and covariance:
E [ηi (t) ηi′ (t
′)] = δ (t− t′)Hi,i′ [~p] , (2)
The first three terms in the r.h.d. of Eq. (1) detail a simple behavioral model of how the
consumption of household i depends on her income and wealth. The term in square
brackets represents the disposable income of household i, which arises i) from the re-
turn on investment, at an interest rate ρ, taxed by government at a flat rate τk, and ii)
from income from labor, which is taxed at a rate τl. Here ω is the wage rate and li is
the labor endowment of household i. The last two terms in the square brackets denote
the equal redistribution of collected taxes on capital and labor markets, respectively,
where p¯ and l¯ are the average wealth and labor endowment. A fraction s of the income
is saved, i.e. s is the saving rate on income. The term χ represents minimal consump-
tion, i.e. the rate at which household would consume in the absence of wealth and
income, whereas ν is the rate of consumption of wealth. This simple consumption
model finds solid empirical support, as discussed in Fiaschi and Marsili (2009).
The return of capital markets ρ and the wage rate ω are fixed by the equilibrium
conditions of the economy. In brief, each firm j buys capital kj and labor lj from house-
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holds in capital and labor markets, i.e.:
kj =
N∑
i=1
θi,jpi, lj =
N∑
i=1
φi,j, j = 1, . . . , F,
where θi,j (φi,j) is the fraction of i’s wealth (labor) invested in firm j. These are used
as inputs in the production of firm j, and produce an amount dyj = q(kj, lj)dAj of
output in the time interval dt. Here q(k, l) is the production function of firms, whereas
dAj(t) is an idiosyncratic shock, which is modeled as a random variable with mean
E[dAj] = adt and variance a
2∆dt.
Under the standard assumption that q(k, l) = lg(k/l) is an homogeneous function
of degree one, when capital and labor markets clear, we find that i) each firm has the
same capital to labor ration kj/lj = λ, ii) the return on capital is given by ρ = ag
′(λ)
and iii) the wage rate is ω = a[g(λ) − λg′(λ)]. Since labor and capital are provided by
households, and because of i), the constant λ = p¯ also equals household wealth per
unit labor. Setting li = 1 for all i, the constant λ then equals the average wealth p¯ of
households.
The covariance of the stochastic noise in Eq. (1) is given by:
Hi,i′ [~p] = ∆s
2
{
(1− τk)2ρ2pipi′Θi,i′ + (1− τl)2 ω2lili′Φi,i′ +
+ (1− τk)(1− τl)ρω [pili′Ωi,i′ + lipi′Ωi′,i] +
+
τkρ+ τlω/λ
N
[(1− τk)ρ(piϑi + pi′ϑi′) + (1− τl)ω(liϕi + li′ϕi′)] +
+
[τkρ+ τlω/λ]
2
N2
F∑
j=1
k2j
}
,
where
ϑi =
N∑
i′=1
Θi,i′pi′, ϕi =
N∑
i′=1
Ωi,i′pi′. (3)
and
Θi,i′ =
F∑
j=1
θi,jθi′,j, Ωi,i′ =
F∑
j=1
θi,jφi′,j and Φi,i′ =
F∑
j=1
φi,jφi′,j. (4)
The parameters in Eq. (3) characterize the degree of intertwinement of economic in-
teractions, i.e. how random shocks propagate throughout the economy. For example
Θi,i′ is a scalar which represents the overlap of investments of dynasty i with those of
dynasty i′.
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3 Infinite Economy
We analyze the properties of the stochastic evolution of wealth discussed in the previ-
ous paragraph in the case of an infinite economy, that is of an economy where N and
F → ∞. In particular, we assume that F = fN , where f is a positive constant. This
assumption is not a relevant limitation of the analysis because in a real economyN and
F may be of the order of some millions. We take the further simplifying assumption
that households do not differ among themselves in their endowment of labour li, in
the diversification of their portfolios Θi,i, in the allocation of their wealth among the
firms where they are working Ωi,i and in the number of firms where they are working
Φi,i, i.e. we assume that: li = l¯ = 1, Θi,i = Θ¯, Ωi,i = Ω¯ and Φi,i = Φ¯ ∀i. For example,
Θ¯ = 1 implies no diversification of the dynasties’ portfolios (i.e. all wealth is invested
in the same firm), whereas Θ = 1/F (i.e. Θ → 0 for F → ∞) corresponds to maximal
diversification of portfolios; similarly, Φ = 1 means that each dynasty is working in
just one firm.
In the limit N,F → ∞, the per capita wealth p¯ follows a deterministic dynamics
given by
dp¯
dt
= s (ρp¯ + ω)− χ− vp¯. (5)
Besides a technical condition1, this result requires that the average wealth satisfies the
Law of Large Numbers, i.e. that the wealth distribution f(p) has a finite first moment.
Two different regimes are possible: i) the stationary economy where wealth is con-
stant in equilibrium; and ii) the endogenous growth economy, where wealth is growing
at constant rate in equilibrium.
3.1 Stationary Economy
If the growth rate of per capita wealth becomes negative for large value of p¯, i.e. if
lim
p¯→∞
g′ (p¯) <
ν
sa
, (6)
then the economy approaches a stationary state.2 In this case, the distribution of wealth
depends on the parameters Θ¯, Φ¯ and Ω¯:
• In an infinite economy when household can fully diversify both their income
from capital investment and labour (i.e. θi,j = φi,j = 1/F ), they can eliminate all
1The technical condition
∑N
i=1 θi,j ≤ θ¯ ∀j,N is needed to show this result.
2For the proof see Fiaschi and Marsili (2009).
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sources of risk, i.e. Θ¯, Ω¯ = Φ¯ = 0. Therefore their income is deterministic and,
in equilibrium, they all end up with the same wealth, i.e. pi = p¯. Therefore, if
Θ¯, Ω¯ = Φ¯ = 0 (complete markets) then:
f (pi) = δ (pi − p¯) . (7)
• When households can fully diversify their portfolios (θi,j = 1/F ), but they work
in a limited number of firms, the wealth distribution is determined by the unin-
surable idiosyncratic shocks arising from labour income. In this case, in the in-
finite economy, Θ¯, Ω¯ = 0 and Φ¯ > 0 and, the equilibrium distribution of wealth
attains a Gaussian shape,
f (pi) = N e−
(z0−z1pi)
2
z1a0 , (8)
with mean z0/z1 = p¯ and variance a0/ (2z1) (these parameters are defined below
in Eq. (9)).
• In the more realistic incomplete market case, i.e. Θ¯, Ω¯, Φ¯ > 0, i.e. when full diver-
sification is not possible, both in the capital and in the labor market (incomplete
markets), then:
f (pi) =
[
N
(a0 + a1pi + a2p
2
i )
1+z1/a2
]
e
4
"
z0+z1a1/(2a2)√
4a0a2−a
2
1
#
arctan
 
a1+2a2pi√
4a0a2−a
2
1
!
; (9)
where
z0 = s [ω
∗ + τkρ
∗p¯]− χ;
z1 = ν − s (1− τk) ρ∗;
a0 = ∆s
2 (1− τl)2 ω∗2Φ¯;
a1 = 2∆s
2(1− τk)(1− τl)ρ∗ω∗Ω¯ and
a2 = ∆s
2 (1− τk)2 ρ∗2Θ¯,
where N is a constant defined by the condition ∫∞
−∞
f (pi) dpi = 1. For large pi
f (pi) ∼ p−α−1i follows a Pareto distribution whose exponent is given by:
α = 1 + 2z1/a2 = 1 + 2
ν − s (1− τk) ρ∗
∆s2(1− τk)2ρ∗2Θ¯ . (10)
We observe that z1, a2 > 0 (see Eq. 6) and hence α > 1: this ensures that the first
moment of the wealth distribution is indeed finite.
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• The case Θ¯ > 0 and Φ¯ = Ω¯ = 0 corresponds to the rather unrealistic situation
where households distribute their labor on all firms. It turns out, however, that
the resulting distribution of wealth is exactly the same as that of an economy in
which Trade Unions have a very strong market power, such that the bargaining
on labour market is completely centralized. Hence wages are fixed (staggered
wages) in the short run and productivity shocks are absorbed by the returns on
capital. Mathematically this corresponds exactly to the case Φ¯ = Ω¯ = 0, for which
the distribution of wealth reads
f (pi) =
N
a2p
2(1+z1/a2)
i
e
−
“
2z0
a2pi
”
, (11)
where N is a normalization constant, z1 and a2 are the same as above.
The results above indicate that while the bottom of the wealth distribution is deter-
mined by the labormarket, the top tail only depends on the working of capital markets.
If wages respond to productivity shocks and households are not able to fully diversify
their employment (as is typically the case), then the distribution extends to negative
values of the wealth. If, instead, staggered wages are imposed by a centralized bar-
gaining in the labor market, then inequality in the bottom tail is highly reduced.
With respect to the upper tail, we observe that the assumption Θi,i = Θ¯ ∀i elim-
inates cross-household heterogeneity in Eq. (9). However, it is worth noting that if
dynasties were heterogeneous in their portfolio diversification, i.e. Θi,i 6= Θi′,i′ , then
the top tail distribution would be populated by the dynasties with the highestΘi,i, that
is by those dynasties with the less diversified portfolios. This finding agrees with the
empirical evidence on the low diversification of the portfolios of wealthy households
discussed in Guiso et al. (2001), Cap. 10.
The (inverse of the) exponent α provides a measure of inequality. Our results show
that inequality increases with the volatility ∆ of productivity shocks and with the con-
centration Θ¯ of household portfolios, and it decreases with capital taxation τk.
Changes in s and v have, on the contrary, an ambiguous effect on the size of the
top tail of distribution of wealth. More precisely, an increase in the gross return on
capital ρ∗ amplifies inequality (i.e. ∂α/∂ρ∗ < 0). When s increases a direct effect tends
to decrease α, while an induced effect tends to increase α, because it causes an increase
in the equilibrium per capita wealth p¯∗, and hence a decrease in the return on capital
ρ∗. When ν increases the contrary happens. Without specifying the technology g(λ)
it is not possible to determine which effect prevails (see Fiaschi and Marsili (2009) for
some examples).
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3.2 Endogenous Growth Economy
If the dynamics of per capita wealth obeys Eq. (5) and
lim
p¯→∞
g′ (p¯) >
v
sa
, (12)
then, in the long run, the returns on factors are given by:
ρ∗ = lim
p¯→∞
ag′ (p¯) and (13)
ω∗ = 0. (14)
and per capita wealth grows at the rate3
ψEG = lim
p¯→∞
sag′ (p¯)− ν = sρ∗ − ν. (15)
Notice that ψEG is independent of the flat tax rate on capital4 τk and of the diversi-
fication of dynasty i’s portfolio Θ¯; however, ψEG increases with saving rate s and with
return on capital ρ∗ and it decreases with ν; changes in technology which increase the
return on capital, therefore, also cause an increase in ψEG.
The distribution of wealth is best described in terms of the relative per capita wealth
of households ui = pi/p¯. In the long run household i’s relative wealth obeys the fol-
lowing stochastic differential equation:
lim
t→∞
dui
dt
= sρ∗τk(1− ui) + η˜i, (16)
where η˜i = ηi/p¯ is a white noise term with E [η˜i (t)] = 0 and covariance:
E [η˜i (t) η˜i′ (t
′)] = δ (t− t′)Hi,i′ [~u] , (17)
where:
lim
t→∞
lim
N→∞
Hi,i′[~u] =
[
∆s2(1− τk)2ρ∗2Θi,i′
]
uiui′.
In the limit p¯ → ∞ the equilibrium wage rate converges to 0 and therefore wages
do not play any role in the dynamics of relative per capita wealth of dynasty i, as stated
3If g (0) > χ/ (sa), this result holds independently of the initial level of per capita wealth, otherwise
endogenous growth sets in only if the initial per capita wealth is sufficient high (see Fiaschi and Marsili
(2009)).
4This is due to the assumption of constant saving rate s. Generally, s increases with the net return
on capital (1− τk) ρ∗, hence s decreases with τk. This suggests that the growth rate ψEG decreases with
capital taxation τk.
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above. In the long run, the equilibrium distribution of the relative per capita wealth ui,
in the non-trivial (and realistic) case of incomplete markets Θ¯ > 0, is given by
fEG(ui) =
NEG
uα
EG+1
i
e−(α
EG
−1)/ui , (18)
where NEG is a normalization constant, and
αEG = 1 + 2
τk
∆s(1− τk)2ρ∗Θ¯ (19)
is the Pareto exponent.
We remark that while capital taxation τk has no direct effect on growth, it has a
direct effect on inequality.5 Hence capital taxes do not (directly) affect growth, but have
a crucial redistributive function: wealth is redistributed away from wealthy to poor
dynasties by an amount proportional to aggregate wealth, so preventing the possible
ever-spreading wealth levels, and stabilizing the equilibrium distribution of relative
wealth.
Finally, the Pareto exponent is continuous across the transition from a stationary to
an endogenously growing economy, i.e.
lim
sρ∗−ν→0−
α = lim
sρ∗−ν→0+
αEG,
though it has a singular behaviour in the first derivative (with respect to ν or s). We
remark that the Pareto exponent αEG decreases with saving rate s, return on capital
ρ∗, the diversification of portfolio Θ¯ and it increases with τk; α
EG is, on the contrary,
independent of ν.
Interestingly, since ψEG increases with s and ρ∗, we find an inverse relationship be-
tween growth and wealth inequality. Indeed the Pareto exponent αEG and the growth
rate ψEG show an inverse relationship under changes in saving rate s and/or return on
capital ρ∗. For example, an economy increasing its saving rate s (or its return on capital
ρ∗) should move to an equilibriumwhere both its growth rate and its wealth inequality
(in the top tail of the distribution of wealth) are larger than before. The behavior of the
Pareto exponent and of the growth rate is illustrated in Fig. 1 for a particular choice of
the production function.
5The results above, in the limit τk → 0, do not reproduce the behavior of the economy with τk = 0:
Indeed, Eq. (16), with τk = 0 andHi,i′ = 0 for i 6= i′, describes independent log-normal processes ui (t).
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Figure 1: Behavior of the Pareto exponent as a function of the parameter ν for an economy
where g(λ) = [ǫλγ + 1 − ǫ]1/γ (constant elasticity of substitution technology) with ǫ = 0.2 and
γ = 0.7. The other parameters take values: a = 1.0, s = 0.2, τk = 0.2 and∆Θ = 300.
4 Conclusions and future research
This paper discusses how the equilibrium distribution of wealth can be derived from
the equilibrium of an economy with a large number of firms and households, who in-
teract through the capital and the labour markets. Under incomplete markets, the top
tail of the equilibrium distribution of wealth is well-represented by a Pareto distribu-
tion, whose exponent depends on the saving rate, on the net return on capital, on the
growth rate of the population, on the tax on capital income and on the degree of diver-
sification of portfolios. On the other hand, the bottom tail of the distribution mostly
depends on the working of the labour market: a labour market with a centralized bar-
gaining where workers do not bear any risk determines a lower wealth inequality.
Our framework neglects important factors which have been shown to have a rele-
vant impact on the distribution of wealth (see Davies and Shorrocks (1999)). Moreover,
our analysis is relative to the equilibrium distribution of wealth and it neglects out-of-
equilibrium behaviour and issues related to the speed of convergence. The relationship
between the distribution of wealth and the distribution of income, as well as its relation
with the distribution of firm sizes is a further interesting extension of our analysis.
An additional interesting aspect is that of finite size effects in aggregate fluctua-
tions. This issue has been recently addressed by Gabaix (2008) in an economy in which
aggregate wealth exhibits a stochastic behaviour. In the light of our findings, the lat-
ter behaviour can arises because of correlations in productivity shocks, which were
neglected here, because dynasties concentrate their investments in few firms/assets
10
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or because the number of firms/assets is much smaller than the number of dynasties.
This extension would draw a theoretical link between the dynamics of the distribution
of wealth, the distribution of firm size and business cycle.
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